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L Introduction
Society views the law as a means of seeking truth and dispensing
justice.1 The issue of witness credibility lies at the heart of this search.2
The law constantly seeks accurate methods of measuring witness credibility
by either verifying truthfulness or detecting deception The most important
scientific technique for assessing a witness's credibility is the polygraph
test.4 Nevertheless, courts have been extremely reluctant to embrace the
use of polygraph evidence.5
This Note analyzes the role of polygraph evidence in federal criminal
cases. Part II provides a brief introduction to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence governing admissibility of polygraph evidence.' Part H describes the
different tests used to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence with
special emphasis on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the most
recent Supreme Court decision in the area. Part H.A focuses on the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of Daubert as the case relates to polygraph evidence
in United States v. Posado.8 Posado is a revolutionary decision which
1. See Barry Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in
Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920 (1975)
(describing judicial duty of searching for truth and maintaining integrity).
2. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 1 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 8, at 215 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that witness credibility plays prominent role in trials).
3. Id.; see Tarlow, supra note 1, at 920 (describing polygraph as method of measur-
ing witness credibility and controlling perjury in court system).
4. See GANNELu & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 215 (observing that polygraph
technique is most important of all deception detection tests).
5. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, 22 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5169, at 99 (1978) (articulating belief of some commentators that courts have
latent anxiety regarding polygraphs because of "Man v. Machine psychology" and, specifi-
cally, because of jurisprudential idea that polygraph machines represent invasion into areas
best left to human resolution).
6. See infra Part II (describing Federal Rules of Evidence relevant to admissibility
determination when polygraph evidence is at issue).
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); United States v.
Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923); infra Part I (reviewing pre-Daubert polygraph cases).
8. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995); see infra Part I.A (discussing Posado as interpreta-
tion of Daubert in context of polygraph evidence admissibility).
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concludes that a per se ban on polygraph evidence is untenable after
Daubert. Further, Posado articulates a three-step inquiry applicable to all
cases in which there is an issue of polygraph evidence admissibility. The
tripartite inquiry is not a monumental departure in the area of polygraph
admissibility, but the Fifth Circuit's analysis is remarkably broad.
Part III.B discusses how other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
responded to Daubert and how their responses differed from the Fifth
Circuit's approach.' Part III.C analyzes the impact of the decision and
examines how district courts in the Fifth Circuit have applied Posado.10
Part IV describes the three primary arguments against admitting polygraph
evidence: (1) that the polygraph is unreliable, (2) that the evidence has an
undue impact on the jury, and (3) that defendants can manipulate results by
using a friendly polygrapher. Part IV concludes that empirical analysis
does not support any of these contentions." Part V articulates a constitu-
tional argument based on Due Process Clause and Confrontation Clause
principles for admitting exculpatory polygraph evidence. Part VI then
analyzes the admissibility of polygraph evidence generally in criminal cases
under the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 Finally, Part VII of this
Note offers a pragmatic solution to the problem of when to admit polygraph
evidence.14
II. The Applicable Federal Rules of Evidence
The admissibility of polygraph evidence implicates numerous Federal
Rules of Evidence, including Rules 104(a), 401, 402, 403, 608(a), 702, and
703. Rule 104(a) states that a court shall make all determinations regarding
9. United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1343 (1996); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 795 (1996); Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1793 (1995); infra Part III.B (noting reaction of other United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals to Daubert's treatment of polygraph evidence).
10. United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Ulmer v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1995); infra Part III.C (describing
district court decisions addressing polygraph evidence in Fifth Circuit after Posado).
11. See infra Part IV (articulating primary concerns about admitting polygraph
evidence in court and demonstrating that existing empirical data lends no support to those
assertions).
12. See infra Part V (describing constitutional argument for admitting exculpatory
polygraph evidence).
13. See infra Part VI (analyzing admissibility of polygraph evidence in criminal cases
under relevant Federal Rules of Evidence).
14. See infra Part VII (articulating pragmatic solution to problem of when to admit
polygraph evidence).
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the admissibility of evidence.'" Rule 401 governs the relevance of evidence
and defines relevant evidence as any evidence tending to make the existence
of any consequential fact more or less probable.6 Rule 402 complements
Rule 401 by stating that relevant evidence generally is admissible. 7 Rule
403 also governs relevance and notes that if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, then the court
may exclude the evidence.' 8
Rule 608(a) states that evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after a party has attacked a witness's character for truthfulness. 9 Rule
608(a) is important because it provides an evidentiary theory as to how
courts may admit polygraph evidence generally."
Rules 702 and 703 provide an alternative basis for polygraph admissi-
bility.2  Rule 702 provides that if scientific knowledge will assist the trier
of fact in determining a fact at issue, then a witness qualified as an expert
may give an opinion based on his or her specialized knowledge.' Rule 703
15. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a) (noting that "[p]reliminary questions concerning ... the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court").
16. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
17. See FED R. EVID. 402 (asserting that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority" and
that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible").
18. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
19. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (stating that "evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise").
20. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 608 as evidentiary
basis for admitting polygraph evidence).
21. See infra notes 22-23 (describing terms of Rules 702 and 703). Assuming the
proffered polygraph evidence will assist the trier of fact, it is conceivable that a polygraphist
could testify as an expert under Rule 702. Further, Rule 703 allows an expert to base an
opinion on evidence that itself is inadmissible, so arguably the admissibility of polygraph
evidence is a moot point because an expert may testify as to polygraph results pursuant to Rule
703. However, as a practical matter, courts simply do not accept such a theory, as evidenced
by the consistent refusal of most courts to admit polygraph evidence.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (noting that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise").
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provides that so long as the inferences that provide the basis for the expert's
opinion are of a type upon which other experts reasonably rely, then the
facts or data underlying the theory need not be admissible.'
III. The Changing Standards for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
The general distrust of polygraph evidence has a long and storied
history in the United States judicial system and begins with the landmark
case of Frye v. United States.24 In Frye, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered whether to admit
expert testimony based on a crude predecessor of the modem polygraph.'
The court concluded that the evidence was inadmissible because the poly-
graph had not gained "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific commu-
nity.26 The general acceptance principle espoused in Frye became the
threshold of admissibility for novel scientific evidence.' With a few
exceptions, post-Frye federal courts overwhelmingly rejected polygraph
evidence for nearly half a century.' In the early 1970s, however, the
23. See FED. R. EVID. 703 ("The facts... upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field... the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.").
24. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
25. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (concluding that
systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained enough scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities to justify court's admission of expert testimony
deduced from test). In Frye, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered whether to admit into evidence the expert testimony of a psychologist who
conducted a "systolic blood pressure deception test" on the defendant. Id. at 1014. Before
his trial for murder, the defendant arranged to take this deception test, a precursor to the
modem polygraph, in the presence of a scientific expert in hopes of bolstering his case. Id.
Defendant's counsel asked that the witnessing expert be allowed to testify to the results of the
blood pressure test. Id. The Government objected to the proffered testimony, and the court
sustained that objection. Id. The defendant's counsel then offered to have the test conducted
in the presence of the jury. Id. The court also denied this request. Id. The district court
found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder. Id. at 1013. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the district court should have admitted the expert's opinion because of the general
rule that opinions of skilled witnesses are admissible in cases in which experienced persons are
unlikely to prove capable of formulating an informed opinion on the offered evidence. Id. at
1014. The court of appeals determined that the test was inadmissible because the principles
that provided the basis for the test had not gained sufficient recognition in the relevant
scientific community, composed of psychologists and psychiatrists. Id.
26. Id. at 1014.
27. Id.
28. See Charles M. Sevilla, Polygraph 1984: Behind the Closed Doors of Admissibility,
16 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 5, 7 (1984) (describing federal courts' propensity to reject poly-
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federal courts made a tentative movement toward admitting unstipulated
polygraph evidence in limited circumstances.29 For the first time, courts
accepted polygraph results in the absence of both parties' approval.'
However, the trend in favor of admissibility that these cases seemed to
foreshadow never materialized, although commentators of the time main-
tained that these decisions altered the judicial approach to polygraph evi-
dence.
3 1
In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
issued a monumental decision in the area of polygraph law in United States
v. Piccinonna 2 The Piccinonna court determined that polygraph evidence
is admissible in two specific instances: (1) when a two-party stipulation
articulates the scope and purpose of admitting the polygraph evidence or
(2) when used to impeach or to corroborate the testimony of a witness at
trial.33 In fact, some authors believed that Piccinonna could become the
graph evidence from time of Frye decision until early 1970s).
29. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 231 (discussing instances when
court admitted polygraph evidence (1) as relevant to perjury issue, (2) during suppression
hearing because court deemed polygraph technique as "generally accepted," or (3) at trial
because polygraph was capable of producing highly probative evidence); see also Sevilla, supra
note 28, at 8-9 (discussing generally judicial movement toward admitting unstipulated poly-
graph evidence in early 1970s).
30. See Sevilla, supra note 28, at 9.
31. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 232 n.87 (citing multiple
commentators who maintained that short-lived trend in favor of admissibility had some impact
on judicial approach to polygraph evidence).
32. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
33. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(finding that polygraph evidence is not inadmissible when both parties stipulate in advance as
to circumstances of test and as to scope of admissibility or, alternatively, when used to
impeach or to corroborate witness testimony at trial). In Piccinonna, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered the issue of the admissibility of polygraph
expert testimony and examination evidence at trial. Id. at 1530. In 1983, a grand jury
conducted hearings to investigate alleged antitrust violations in the garbage disposal business.
Id. The defendant operated a waste disposal business in southern Florida, and the grand jury
compelled him to testify on his dealings within the industry. Id. The grand jury granted
Piccinonna immunity for the substantive information revealed in his testimony, but he was not
protected from prosecution based on any perjury he might commit. Id. The defendant denied
knowledge of the alleged antitrust violations. Id. Subsequently, several other witnesses from
the industry contradicted the defendant's testimony by implicating him in the wrongdoing. Id.
After being indicted on four counts of perjury, the defendant arranged to take a polygraph
examination prior to trial. Id. He asked that the Government stipulate to allowing an expert
testify regarding the polygraph results. Id. The Government refused the offer. Id. Nonethe-
less, the defendant took a test administered by a licensed polygraph examiner, and he asserted
that the expert's report conclusively supported his claim that he had not misrepresented the
truth in front of the grand jury. Id. The trial judge refused to admit the evidence based on
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seminal case legitimizing polygraph evidence in the federal courts.' How-
ever, the Piccinonna ruling lost some of its luster when the Supreme Court
chose to revisit the Frye standards regarding the general admissibility of
scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. I
Determining that the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence superseded the Frye approach, the Daubert Court explicitly rejected
the general acceptance standard. 6 Instead of applying Frye's "aus-
the Eleventh Circuit's per se exclusion rule regarding polygraph evidence. Id. After review-
ing both traditional approaches and modem judicial standards, the court of appeals explicitly
rejected its prior per se rule of exclusion. Id. at 1536. The Piccinonna court gave three
reasons for its conclusion. Id. at 1535. First, polygraph testing had gained increased accep-
tance in the scientific community as a useful and reliable scientific tool. Id. Second, the court
referenced the recent technological advances in the field. Id. Third, the Piccinonna court
noted that there was no evidence that juries were unduly swayed by polygraph evidence. Id.
The court of appeals then determined that there were two specific instances in which polygraph
evidence could be introduced at trial. Id. at 1536. The first instance is when both parties
stipulate in advance as to the circumstances of the test and the scope of its admissibility, and
the second occasion is when the evidence is needed to impeach or corroborate the testimony
of a witness at trial. Id. Consequently, the Piccinonna court decided that a per se rule dis-
allowing polygraph evidence was no longer viable. Id. at 1535-36.
34. See W. Thomas Halbleib, Note, United States v. Piccinonna: The Eleventh Circuit
Adds Another Approach to Polygraph Evidence in the Federal System, 80 Ky. L.J. 225, 227
(1991) (asserting that Piccinonna decision represented substantial step toward judicial legit-
imacy of polygraph evidence).
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 583-88 (1993) (determining that
"general acceptance" is not precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence under Federal
Rules of Evidence and that trial judge is responsible for ensuring that expert testimony is both
reliable and relevant within meaning of Rules). In Daubert, the Supreme Court considered the
admissibility of qualified expert testimony regarding whether the drug Bendectin caused birth
defects even though this testimony was contrary to the vast body of epidemiological data
concerning the drug. Id. at 583-85. Both the district court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the expert opinion was inadmissible because the
principles that provided the basis for the testimony did not have sufficient general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test. Id. at 587. Instead of adhering to the
general acceptance test, the Court described a more flexible inquiry based on whether the
proffered evidence was relevant and reliable under the language of the Rules. Id. at 589-95.
The Court noted that Rules 401 and 402 are very liberal regarding the basic standards for
relevance. Id. at 587. As for the reliability aspect, the Supreme Court described a four factor
test to resolve the inquiry. Id. at 593-95. First, the court should ask whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested. Id. Second, the court should examine whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Id. Third, the court
should consider the potential rate of error as it relates to determining whether the evidence is
reliable. Id. Finally, general acceptance can have a bearing on the reliability assessment,
although it is no longer dispositive of the issue as it was under the Frye test. Id. Thus, the
Daubert Court rejected the general acceptance test as the only indicia of admissibility. Id. at
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tere 'I standard, the Court enunciated a more flexible approach based
primarily on the Federal Rules of Evidence.38 Because the Frye Court did
not find the general acceptance test in either the language or the legislative
history of the Federal Rules of Evidence,39 the Court concluded that the test
no longer applied." Instead, the Court determined that Rule 702 required
a determination whether the proffered evidence was sufficiently reliable to
be admissible as "scientific knowledge" and whether the proffered evidence
was relevant by helping the trier of fact to "understand the evidence or to
determine a fact at issue. 
41
Daubert is in many ways a cryptic decision42 because both proponents
and opponents of scientific evidence have found support in its language.43
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion emphasizes the liberal nature of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 401." A plain reading of
Rule 401 suggests that the threshold for relevance is low,45 and the Daubert
opinion asserts that vigorous cross-examination, opposing evidence, and
careful jury instruction remain the appropriate methods of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.' Furthermore, the Court's inquiry focuses on the
principles and methodology used and not the conclusions that those princi-
ples generate.47
597-98. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the
case for further proceedings in light of the new reliability and relevancy inquiry required
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 598.
37. See id. at 589 (implying that Frye general acceptance test is too inflexible and that
new, four-part inquiry enables courts to have more discretion when making admissibility
determinations).
38. Id. at 592-95.
39. See supra note 22 (describing terms of Rule 702).
40. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
41. Id. at 589-92; see supra note 22 (quoting from Rule 702).
42. See Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After Daubert- Some Early Returns
from Lower Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 24 (describing Daubert's apparent ambiguity and
how individuals on both sides of scientific evidence debate use opinion to bolster their posi-
tions).
43. See id. (noting that Daubert decision contained language useful for all participants
in scientific evidence debate).
44. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (describing liberal
standard of relevance in Rule 401).
45. See supra note 16 (providing terms of Rule 401 and specifically articulating appli-
cable standard of relevance).
46. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (articulating counterchecks available if trial judge
admits relatively weak evidence).
47. Id.
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However, the text of the Daubert opinion is sufficiently ambiguous that
opponents of admissibility also draw support.' Although general accep-
tance is no longer dispositive of the admissibility of proffered scientific
evidence, it is one of the Court's four indicia of reliability.49 The Court
does not provide a method of weighing these indicia. Consequently, lower
federal courts still could consider the Frye general acceptance principle as
sufficiently important to supersede the other three factors mentioned in
Daubert. Thus, Daubert merely provides a mechanism for a different
analysis of polygraph evidence: it does not mandate such analysis.
A. Posado as a Response to Daubert in the Context of
Polygraph Admissibility
The post-Daubert decisions initially indicated that the federal courts
saw little difference between the Frye and Daubert standards as applied to
polygraph evidence.' One commentator noted that courts had little diffi-
culty shifting from a general acceptance test to a scientific validity analysis
without any change in result.51 In other words, methods that were generally
accepted under Frye are relevant and reliable in Daubert terms, and meth-
ods that were not generally accepted are neither relevant nor reliable.52 In
concluding that polygraph evidence was inadmissible, one court went so far
as to say that the Daubert test changed nothing.53 Author Thomas J. Mack
suggested that, after Daubert, a single test taking the form of Rule 702's
requirements could determine the admissibility of all scientific evidence.'
Rule 702 provides that if scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact in
48. See Mack, supra note 42, at 24 (emphasizing aspects of Daubert opinion that
opponents of scientific evidence admissibility cite in order to exclude proffered evidence).
49. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95 (describing four factors Court specifically
suggested that trial judges weigh when determining whether proffered evidence is reliable:
(1) whether theory or technique can be and has been tested, (2) whether theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) what potential rate of error is, and
(4) whether evidence has gained general acceptance).
50. See United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that
pre-Daubert rationale that excluded polygraph evidence still applies).
51. See Mack, supra note 42, at 24 (asserting that change from Frye general accep-
tance to Daubert scientific validity analysis has not changed results).
52. See id. (observing that Daubert's new test had little impact on results in federal
court system).
53. See Black, 831 F. Supp. at 123 (observing that nothing in Daubert changed how
court analyzed polygraph evidence).
54. See Mack, supra note 42, at 25 (suggesting that Daubert could lead to single Rule
702 test).
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determining a fact at issue, then a witness qualified as an expert may testify
as to an opinion based on his or her specialized knowledge.5 5 The implica-
tion is that so long as evidence survived the Rule 702 inquiry and assisted
the trier of fact, it is immune to challenge under either Rule 403 or Rule
703.56 In the specific area of polygraphs, courts typically employ Rule 403
as a basis for excluding polygraph evidenceY7
In United States v. Posado,58 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its prior conclusion that polygraph evidence
was per se inadmissible for any purpose in a federal court. 9 In Posado,
a jury convicted each of three defendants on one count of conspiracy to
possess cocaine and on one count of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine.' The central issue in the case was whether the defendants gave
valid consent to a search of their luggage.6" The defendants feared that the
suppression hearing would degenerate into a "swearing match" with the
officers testifying that the defendants consented to the search and the
defendants testifying that they did not consent.62 Consequently, both
defendants arranged to take multiple polygraph examinations in an attempt
to bolster their credibility.' Counsel for the defendants contacted the
prosecution and offered the opportunity to participate in the polygraph
55. See supra note 22 (providing terms of Rule 702).
56. See Mack, supra note 42, at 25 (noting that if courts applied single Rule 702 test,
then Rules such as 403 and 703 would be meaningless in context of polygraph evidence);
see also supra note 18 (discussing content of Rule 403); supra note 22 (describing terms of
Rule 702); supra note 23 (quoting language of Rule 703).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming
district court ruling that limited cross-examination regarding polygraph responses of gov-
ernment witness because district court's Rule 403 balancing is afforded special degree of
deference); Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating "that unilaterally
obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Evidence Rule 403"), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-65
(D. Ariz. 1995) (allowing introduction of polygraph evidence for very specific and narrowly
tailored purpose, although evidence meets Rule 702 standards due to Rule 403 concerns);
United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (asserting that court should
not admit proffered polygraph evidence pursuant to Rule 403 even assuming evidence passes
standards of Rule 702 and of Daubert).
58. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
59. See Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th
Cir. 1984) (discussing past polygraph case law in Fifth Circuit and general per se rule of
exclusion).
60. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 429-30.
62. Id. at 430.
63. Id.
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tests.' Additionally, the defendants offered to stipulate before taking the
tests that the prosecution could use the results against them if the results
indicated deception.' The prosecution declined the offers.' After the
three defendants took polygraph tests and two different experts agreed that
the elicited responses did not indicate deception, the defendants asked that
the experts be allowed to testify at the suppression hearing or, in the
alternative, sought a hearing on the admissibility of polygraph evidence
under the applicable Daubert standard and the Federal Rules of Evidence.67
Included in the defendants' proffer was a curriculum vitae for the experts,
as well as the affidavit of another polygraph expert who asserted that the
polygraph technique possessed sufficient scientific validity to be admissi-
ble.68 The district court refused to consider the polygraph testimony and
denied the request for a Daubert hearing.69 At the close of the suppression
hearing, the district court denied the defendants' motion to allow the
polygraphists to testify and concluded that the defendants voluntarily
consented to the search.7" The district court then convicted the defendants
of both conspiracy to possess cocaine and cocaine possession, and the
defendants appealed.71
1. The Initial Step in the Inquiry: The Rule 104(a) Determination of
Relevance and Reliability
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that its per se exclusionary rule was
untenable after Daubert.2 More specifically, the court of appeals outlined
a three-step inquiry to assist lower courts in determining whether the courts
should admit polygraph results: First, the court must determine if the
evidence is relevant and reliable. Second, the court must determine if the
evidence assists the trier of fact in determining a fact at issue. Third, the
court must decide if the evidence has an unfairly prejudicial effect that
would substantially outweigh its probative value. 3 The court of appeals
noted that the Daubert Court held that the trial court must make an initial






70. Id. at 432.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 429.
73. Id. at 432-36.
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determination pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
to whether the proffered evidence possesses both sufficient reliability to be
admissible as "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" and
sufficient relevance to enable the trier of fact to understand better the
evidence or the issue in the case.74 The crux of the reliability inquiry is
whether the evidence is based on a solid foundation rather than on a specu-
lative belief.75 The Fifth Circuit noted the many technological advances in
the field of polygraph instrumentation and technique since the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in Frye.76 In fact, research indicated that polygraph exami-
nations were accurate between seventy percent and ninety percent of the
time when administered under controlled conditions.' According to the
Fifth Circuit, the primary problem with polygraph evidence was the varia-
tion in the qualifications of the examiner and in the quality of the surround-
ing environment.78 However, federal courts routinely find other similar
scientific evidence admissible,79 and requirements for professional poly-
graphists have become standardized.' Furthermore, the polygraph is
74. See id. at 432 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993));
supra note 15 (providing terms of Rule 104(a)).
75. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing
reliability inquiry in terms of whether proffered evidence has solid scientific foundation
instead of speculative belief as basis).
76. Id. at 434.
77. See id. at 434 n.7 (listing resources which assert that polygraph evidence accu-
rately detects truth or deception between 70% and 90% of time).
78. See id. at 434 & n.8 (citing United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1540-41
(11th Cir. 1989)) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting research
indicating that examiner expertise and test procedure affect accuracy and citing Ronald J.
Simon, Adopting a Military Approach to Polygraph Evidence Admissibility: Why Federal
Evidentiary Protections Will Suffice, 25 TFx. TECH L. REy. 1055, 1063-66 (1994) (discuss-
ing effect of examiner competence, countermeasures, and test integrity to accuracy of
polygraph results)).
79. See Catherine M. Polizzi, A New View into the Truth: Impact of a Reliable
Deception Detection Technology on the Legal System, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
395, 406 (1995) (noting that courts often admit voice identification evidence although
reported error rates vary greatly, whereas polygraph evidence is 85% to 95% accurate for
computer and original examiner interpretation, but is routinely excluded); infra notes 291-94
and accompanying text (describing other types of scientific evidence that have variable error
rates, but which courts routinely admit).
80. Compare Posado, 57 F.3d at 434 n.9 (describing several sources that indicate
more uniformity in field of polygraph evidence and role of American Polygraph Association
(APA) in ensuring competency of members), with David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986:
Scientific, Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding Application and Acceptance of Poly-
graph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 29, 66-67 (asserting that many who conduct polygraph
tests lack training and competence).
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subject to extensive scrutiny in the scientific community,"1 and many
employers, as well as the government, consider it an extremely useful
tool.8
2
The second half of the initial Rule 104(a) inquiry concerns the rele-
vance of the evidence.Y The Fifth Circuit noted that the relatively low
standard of relevance, as defined by Rule 401, makes this inquiry a pro
forma one.' The court concluded that valid polygraph evidence always is
relevant so long as it either corroborates or undermines the credibility of
a contested witness.' Rule 6 08 ,1 which does not allow rehabilitation of a
witness whose credibility has not yet been attacked, is key to this inquiry
and requires an examination of the underlying theory as to why courts
admit polygraph evidence in the first instance.A7
2. The Second Step: The Role of Rule 702 in Polygraph Admissibility
The second aspect of the admissibility test must conform to Rule 702.8
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony at trial and requires
that the offered evidence assist the trier of fact in understanding the evi-
dence or in determining a fact at issue. 9 Thus, Rule 702 has a threshold
for admissibility similar to the Rule 104(a) inquiry.' The key distinction
81. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (claiming that
polygraph is subject to intense scrutiny in scientific community); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing (1984), reprinted in 13 POLY-
GRAPH 1, 58 (Mar. 1984) (noting that there was more scientific research conducted on lie
detectors in past six years than in previous sixty years).
82. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989) (describing
extensive use of polygraphs by government agencies such as FBI, Secret Service, military
intelligence, and law enforcement agencies); cf. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994) (prohibiting use of polygraphs in pre-employment
screening and sharply curtailing permissible uses of polygraph in specific-incident investiga-
tions primarily because of privacy concerns).
83. See supra note 15 (describing terms of Rule 104(a)).
84. Posado, 57 F.3d at 432.
85. See id. at 433 (noting that if polygraph technique is valid measure of verisimili-
tude, then relevance inquiry is resolved even if technique contains uncertainties).
86. See supra note 19 (quoting language of Rule 608(a)).
87. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (articulating theory as to why courts
admit polygraph evidence in context of Rule 608(a)).
88. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) (describing second aspect of admissibil-
ity test)).
89. See supra note 22 (describing contents of Rule 702).
90. Compare supra note 22 (describing Rule 702 requirement that proffered testimony
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is that Rule 702 applies only to expert scientific testimony, whereas Rule
104(a) applies universally. 91
3. The Third Step: Rule 403 Balancing of Probative Value and
Prejudicial Effect
In the final step of the three-part inquiry, the trial court must apply
Federal Rule of Evidence 4039 to determine whether the polygraph evi-
dence would have an unfairly prejudicial effect that would substantially
outweigh probative value. 3 The Posado court explicitly described several
factors that the district court should examine when making its determination
on remand. 94 First, the defense contacted the prosecution long before the
examiners conducted the polygraph tests; therefore, the prosecution had an
opportunity to participate in the examinations. 9 Furthermore, the defen-
dants agreed to stipulate before the polygraph examinations that the prose-
cution could introduce any results indicating deception if the prosecution
would reciprocate and allow the introduction of any results that corrobo-
rated the defendants' claims.' Thus, both parties bore some risk in the
outcome of the proposed examinations because the results would corrobo-
rate either the defendants' or the officers' version of the facts. 7 Because
both parties bore some risk in the examination the Fifth Circuit determined
that the situation reduced the possibility of unfair prejudice and enhanced
the reliability of the evidence.98 The court looked with disfavor on unilater-
ally obtained results because the defendants had no risk in such a situation:
the accused simply would not offer the polygraph results if they were
unfavorable. 99 Next, the court considered that the defendants sought to
assist trier of fact in understanding evidence or in determining fact at issue), with supra note
15 (describing Rule 104(a) requirement that court make preliminary determination that
evidence offered is relevant and reliable before deciding whether to admit evidence).
91. Compare supra note 22 (describing limited applicability of Rule 702 because Rule
only applies to expert scientific testimony), with supra note 15 (describing applicability of
Rule 104(a) to all potential evidence).
92. See supra note 18 (quoting language of Rule 403).
93. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (organizing facts that district court should consider




97. See id. at 431 (describing terms of offer made by defendants in attempt to persuade
Government to participate in polygraph examinations).
98. Id. at 435.
99. See id. at 431 (implying that because defendant extended to prosecution offer to
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introduce the evidence in a pretrial hearing before a judge, rather than at
trial in front of a jury."°° The presence of the judge as arbiter mitigated any
possible prejudice that could have ensued in the pretrial proceedings."'
The final factor the Fifth Circuit mentioned in determining whether the
polygraph evidence would have an unfairly prejudicial effect was the need
for the evidence, as measured by whether the evidence assists in clarifying
conflicting factual accounts of the conduct at issue."
Interestingly, the Posado court suggested that the trier of fact should
decide between two plausible stories without the help of the proffered poly-
graph evidence."0 3 Thus, the Posado court asserted that courts should not
use polygraph results as "tie-breaker" evidence."° If some doubt existed
as to the veracity of one version of the events, then the court of appeals
would be more likely to admit the polygraph evidence to help resolve the
dispute. 15
In Posado, a substantial amount of evidence called the officers' version
of the facts into doubt."° For example, the defendants in Posado spoke
only Spanish, and only one Spanish-speaking officer was on the scene.10
7
Therefore, that officer was the only law enforcement official who could
testify as to what he had told the defendants, specifically with regard to the
key issues of whether the defendants thought they were under arrest and
whether they consented to a search of their luggage.108 The Spanish-speak-
ing officer testified at trial that he explained the search consent form to the
defendants, yet the same officer was unable to read the consent form, which
was written in Spanish, to the court at either the probable cause hearing or
the suppression hearing. 9 In addition, the officers' recollections of events
were questionable.110 One officer testified incorrectly at the probable cause
hearing that the defendants were traveling with one-way tickets and that this
participate, probative value of results presumably was higher because prosecution could have
used unfavorable results against defendant; thus both parties bore some risk in outcome of
examination).






106. Id. at 436.
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contributed to his reasonable suspicion that the defendants were transporting
narcotics.' In fact, the defendants had round-trip tickets."' Furthermore,
a disinterested witness, an airline employee, contradicted the officers'
descriptions of the events surrounding the retrieval of the defendants' bags
prior to the search."1 Finally, at the suppression hearing, the defendants
introduced an order from another district court that involved the Spanish-
speaking officer and which called his credibility into question. u 4 In a case
factually similar to Posado, a judge had found that the Spanish-speaking
officer's version of the events leading up to the search was "untruthful,"
and the court subsequently suppressed the evidence that the officer had
obtained after the defendants allegedly consented to the search." 5 These
inconsistencies convinced the court that there was a need for the polygraph
evidence to clarify the competing factual accounts of the events." 6
The third factor, the need for the evidence, has an interesting and
perhaps anomalous repercussion." 7 The Fifth Circuit implied that had the
polygraph results merely served the purpose of tiebreaker evidence between
the conflicting factual accounts of the events in question, then the court
would not have admitted the results of the examinations.1 8  However,
because independent evidence supported the defendants' version of the






116. Id. at 435-36.
117. See Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 302 (W.D. La.
1995) (describing counterintuitive nature of Fifth Circuit's approach in Posado). The United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana observed that, under the Posado
rule, if the case is truly close, the evidence has less probative value and the court is less
likely to admit the polygraph results. Id. However, if the court already doubts one party's
version of events, then there is an increased probative value in the polygraph results because
they help resolve latent ambiguity. Id.
118. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that if
polygraph evidence is mere tiebreaker evidence and trier of fact must decide between stories
of relatively equal plausibility, then evidence may have less probative value as compared to
prejudicial effect); see also Ulmer, 897 F. Supp. at 302 (interpreting Posado as stating that
polygraph results used as tiebreaker evidence have less probative value).
119. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (noting that there was increased need in this case
because of numerous events that cast doubt upon officers' version of facts); see also Ulmer,
897 F. Supp. at 302 (suggesting that if one party in dispute raised serious questions about
veracity of other party's version of events in question, then mechanical help in form of
polygraph may have more probative value because it can resolve existing doubts).
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court's last factor leads to a counterintuitive result, namely, that the court
would allow polygraph examination results into evidence only in those cases
in which the court already had a predisposition toward one party in the
dispute. 120 If one party's version of events is subject to suspicion, then
allowing the jury to hear polygraph evidence simply may help clarify the
factual picture."' If, however, the case is very close, the court may prefer
to have a panel of the party's peers - the jury - determine credibility.'
This view may be a remnant of the antiquated jurisprudential notion that
polygraphs invade human autonomy and therefore, are inappropriate in
courts.' m The Posado court implied that polygraph evidence should not be
the deciding factor in close cases.124
In Posado, the Fifth Circuit described Rule 403 as a "gatekeeper" in
the threshold admissibility determination."Z The court suggested that Rule
403 should play an enhanced role, particularly when the proffered scientific
evidence is novel or controversial." In essence, the court of appeals
120. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (describing other independent evidentiary factors that
led court to imply that it would admit polygraph evidence); see also Ulner, 897 F. Supp.
at 302 (elaborating on possibility of admitting polygraph results only when evidence is
nonessential because of existing independent facts).
121. Ulmer, 897 F. Supp. at 302.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (express-
ing concern that polygraph results offered into evidence are likely to distract jury from other
equally persuasive evidence); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(asserting that jury may ascribe aura of infallibility to scientific evidence); GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 232 (positing that major objection to polygraph evidence
is that jury may give "white coat" evidence unjustified weight in deliberations and thereby
sacrifice its independence); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 99 (discussing "Man v.
Machine psychology" and jurisprudential intuition that polygraphs invade human autonomy
and deny due process by effectively dehumanizing justice system and taking ultimate deci-
sion away from jury of parties' peers); Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the
Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 L. & Soc'Y REv. 85, 87 (1982) (alleging that theoretical
underpinning of polygraph evidence - that deceit triggers detectable physical changes -
is incorrect because lying does not produce measurable physical response). But see U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 81, at 63 (claiming accuracy rates of 80% to 95% in crim-
inal investigations that employ controlled testing); infra Part IV (citing studies that indicate
the polygraph evidence is at least as reliable as other types of evidence regularly admitted
by courts).
124. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that
court would not admit polygraph evidence solely as "tiebreaker" evidence when police
officer and defendant have conflicting factual accounts, but rather in cases when there are
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implied that courts should use Rule 403 as a foil to ensure that the liberality
of Rules 401 and 402 and the flexibility of the Daubert inquiry do not open
the floodgates for scientific evidence."z  In practice, however, federal
courts do not use Rule 403 as a gatekeeper, but rather as a watchdog that
consistently turns away polygraph evidence which otherwise is admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'2
B. Other Reactions to Daubert in the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals
In Conti v. Commissioner,29 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit considered whether to admit polygraph evidence in a tax fraud
case.'30 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) concluded
that the taxpayers, a husband and wife, filed incorrect tax returns.' The
dispute centered on how much money the taxpayers had in their home
because this figure was necessary to calculate the taxpayers' net worth.3 2
After settling on a figure for net worth, the Commissioner penalized the
taxpayers for fraud and understatement of income tax.'33 The taxpayers
sued in the Tax Court and challenged the Commissioner's deficiency
determination and the additional penalties imposed for fraud and understate-
ment of income tax."M To support their version of the facts, the taxpayers
127. See id. (asserting that Rule 403 may operate to exclude evidence otherwise admissi-
ble under Rule 702).
128. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that poly-
graph results were inadmissible under Rule 403 even assuming that results could be admitted
under Rule 702), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d
1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence was not,
and usually will not be, admissible pursuant to Rule 403 despite defendant's reliance on
Daubert and Rule 702), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d
299, 305 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's Rule 403 analysis that excluded polygraph
evidence and noting that district court's balancing is afforded special degree of deference in
relation to polygraph evidence); Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating
that unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule 403), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (finding that polygraph results were inadmissible under Rule 403, even assuming that
results were admissible under Rule 702, because defendant's responses would not assist jury
in its inquiry into facts).
129. 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994).
130. See Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 1994) (describing factual back-
ground of case), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
131. Id. at 660.
132. Id. N
133. Id. at 661.
134. Id.
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told an individual representing the Commissioner that they were each
willing to undergo a polygraph examination to prove their innocence.'
However, the Commissioner refused the offer.'36 Nevertheless, the taxpay-
ers took polygraph tests without informing the court or the Commis-
sioner.13 7 At trial, the taxpayers attempted to introduce the results of these
allegedly favorable examinations into evidence, but after an evidentiary
hearing, the Tax Court concluded that the results were, unreliable and
therefore inadmissible. 3 ' The Tax Court relied on two pre-Daubert Sixth
Circuit cases for its conclusion that unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence
is almost never admissible under Rule 403.139
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit restated its strict rule of exclusion regard-
ing unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence, rejected the taxpayers' appeal,
and affirmed the Tax Court's ruling."1 Additionally, the court rejected the
idea that Daubert controlled under these circumstances and instead asserted
that Rule 403 offers a separate and distinct basis for excluding polygraph
results.' 4 1 Apparently, the Daubert decision did not change the Sixth Cir-
cuit's perception of unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence. 2 Presum-
ably, the Sixth Circuit's rationale for excluding unilaterally obtained poly-
graph evidence is that a defendant does not have an adverse interest in a
unilateral examination because the defendant can choose not to offer unfa-





139. Id. at 662 (citing Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding
that unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule 403);
Barnier v. Szentmiknosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1987) (same)).
140. See id. at 663 (articulating rule of exclusion regarding unilaterally obtained poly-
graph evidence).
141. Id. at 662-63.
142. Compare Wolfel, 823 F.2d 970, 973-75 (finding, in pre-Daubert case, that unilat-
erally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule 403), and Bander,
810 F.2d 594, 597 (same), with United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216 (6th Cir. 1995)
(applying strict rule of exclusion in post-Daubert case), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996),
and Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying strict rule of exclusion
regarding unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
Interestingly, Daubert had no impact on admissibility of unilaterally obtained polygraph exams
in the Sixth Circuit whereas, in the Fifth Circuit, Daubert changed the court's view of some
unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence, as exemplified by the Posado decision.
143. See Wolfel, 823 F.2d at 975 (asserting that defendant has no adverse interest in
proceeding when defendant obtains results unilaterally).
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In United States v. Sherlin,'" the Sixth Circuit again considered the
admissibility of unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence. 45 A jury con-
victed the defendant of arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and perjury for
false grand jury testimony. 1 The defendant attempted to introduce unilat-
erally obtained polygraph results into evidence in an effort to boost his
credibility, but the trial court denied his motion. 47 The trial court rejected
the Daubert standards and based its denial of the evidence on Rule 403.141
The Sixth Circuit applied a strict rule of per se exclusion for unilaterally
obtained polygraph evidence and upheld the trial court's decision. 149 The
court of appeals elaborated on its position by stating that, in the absence of
a prior.agreement between the parties that polygraph examination results are
admissible, the probative value of the polygraph is substantially less because
the defendant has no adverse interest in the proceeding and can only benefit
from its results.'10 Further, the court stated that the results of any poly-
graph examination used solely to bolster a witness's credibility are "highly
prejudicial," especially when credibility is central to the verdict.' Thus,
Sherlin differs from Posado in one important respect." In Posado, the
defendants sought to have the polygraph results admitted to bolster credibil-
ity on a peripheral issue - whether the defendants consented before the
officers searched the defendants' bags - whereas in Sherlin, the defendant
wanted the results admitted to bolster his credibility regarding the ultimate
issue of guilt or innocence. 53 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed
144. 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995).
145. United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 795 (1996).
146. Id. at 1211.
147. Id. at 1216.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1217.
150. See id. (implying that probative value of polygraph evidence is partly contingent
upon both parties having interest in outcome).
151. Id.
152. Compare id. (noting that defendant attempted to introduce polygraph results to
bolster his credibility regarding issue to be decided by trier of fact), with United States v.
Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendant sought to have results
admitted to boost credibility on peripheral issue - search - before judge in pretrial
suppression hearing).
153. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that
defendant sought to introduce polygraph test results to prove that he did not lie to grand jury
when he testified that he did not bum down dormitory), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996);
Posado, 57 F.3d at 429 (noting that defendant intended to have polygraph results introduced
to boost credibility regarding search for narcotics, not for purpose of determining whether
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both the approach in Conti and the idea that Daubert analysis is unnecessary
when polygraph evidence fails to meet an independent Rule 403 thresh-
old.154
The Sixth Circuit's opinions on polygraph evidence in the wake of
Daubert clearly conflict with the Fifth Circuit's Posado opinion. Given the
language in the Sixth Circuit's opinions, the Sixth Circuit likely would
conclude that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in a Posado-type case for
several reasons. 5 First, despite the Posado defendants' offer to stipulate
to the admissibility of the results of the polygraph examinations, even if the
results indicated that the search was proper, the Government refused to
participate in the polygraph examinations. 6 Thus, under a strict applica-
tion of the Sherlin per se rule, the Sixth Circuit likely would not admit any
unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence under the initial Rule 403 test.'57
As a practical matter, the Sixth Circuit's decisions eliminate polygraph
evidence from consideration in criminal cases so long as the prosecution
refuses to participate in the tests. 58  Such a rule does not help promote the
efficient administration of justice in a Posado-type case when evidence
shows that the state violated a fundamental right159 and when the govern-
ment's refusal to participate in the examinations seems predicated on the
possibility that the results will harm its case. 60 The premise of the Ameri-
defendant actually possessed contraband).
154. Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217.
155. See id. at 1216 (excluding unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence and stating in
dicta that unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule
403).
156. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (describing defendants' offer that polygraph evidence
would be admissible no matter what results obtained, thereby ensuring risk for both parties).
157. See Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217 (excluding unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence
pursuant to Rule 403); Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (same), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 975 (6th Cir. 1987)
(same); Barnier v. Szentmiknosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
158. See Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1216 (articulating Sixth Circuit rule that unilaterally
obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule 403); Conti, 39 F.3d at
663 (same). From a tactical perspective, such a strict rule encourages the prosecution to
refuse to participate if the evidence against the defendant in a criminal case is reasonably
strong. Any negative results (results that indicate deception) from an examination do little
to benefit the prosecution's case, yet a positive examination has the possibility of raising
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact.
159. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435-36 (describing circumstances which suggested that
officers conducted illegal search).
160. See id. at 435 (describing numerous facts that cast doubt upon officers' version of
events in question). For example, the court noted that the police officer was unable to read
the search consent form in Spanish, despite the fact he allegedly read it to the defendants
789
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can criminal justice system is that all defendants are innocent until proven
guilty. 16' Yet the Sixth Circuit's view effectively deprives the defendant of
a key method of bolstering his or her credibility in response to a govern-
ment accusation." Realistically, a defendant has a slim chance of prevail-
ing when a trial comes down to the testimony of the accused versus the
testimony of a police officer." Although Daubert is susceptible to many
interpretations, the intent behind the decision certainly was not to limit the
possibilities for the accused to raise a successful defense."6 The Sixth
Circuit also opined that it usually would not admit polygraph evidence in
cases in which witness credibility was at issue."6  This rule places an
inherent limitation on criminal defendants.'6
before searching their luggage. Id. In addition, there was a court order from a similar case
in which a district court judge characterized the Spanish-speaking officer's conduct as
untruthful so the court suppressed evidence confiscated from his search. Id. Finally, there
was the testimony of a disinterested witness who contradicted the officers' claim as to how
they retrieved the defendants' luggage. Id. All of these facts, taken as a whole, called into
question the credibility of the officers, but arguably were not fatal to the prosecutor's case.
However, the surrounding facts, coupled with a positive polygraph test result for the
defendant, likely would provide reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact.
161. See Tarlow, supra note 1, at 917 (describing presumption of innocence of all
criminal defendants).
162. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1995) (charging
defendant with conspiracy, arson, and perjury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); Conti,
39 F.3d at 661 (accusing husband and wife of fraud and understatement of income tax
liability).
163. See Tarlow, supra note 1, at 917 (describing case in which Supreme Court of
California deferred to implied finding that officer was truthful and that defendant was not).
In People v. West, an officer testified under oath that the defendant obligingly opened a
trunk to his car, handed the officer a shoebox with contraband in it, and told the officer that
he could take whatever he wanted. People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 412 (Ca. 1970). The
defendant contradicted this testimony. Id. The trial court made an "implied" finding that
the officer told the truth despite the fact that no rational person would have voluntarily given
a box containing contraband to an officer with instructions to search it. Id.
164. See Mack, supra note 42, at 24 (observing that intent of Daubert's more flexible
inquiry was to relax requirements for admission of scientific evidence).
165. See Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217 (asserting that if credibility of witness is central
issue, Sixth Circuit likely would not consider polygraph evidence).
166. Cf. McMorris v. Israeli 643 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981) (determining that
refusal of prosecutor to enter into stipulation admitting polygraph evidence violated due
process because prosecutor failed to articulate valid reason for refusing request). In
McMorris, the prosecution presented a single witness, the victim, in a trial for strong-armed
robbery. Id. at 459. The witness identified the defendant as the assailant. Id. However,
the victim also testified that it was dark that night, that the whole incident was over quickly,
that he never saw the defendant prior to the alleged incident, and that he could not describe
the assailant to the police immediately after the incident. Id. The court acknowledged the
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the
other hand, takes a more moderate view with respect to polygraph evidence
in the post-Daubert era.167 In United States v. Kwong, 6 a jury convicted
the defendant of attempting to murder an Assistant U.S. Attorney by
sending her a briefcase with a bomb in it. 69 The defendant appealed the
conviction on several grounds, most notably on the district court's refusal
to allow a certified polygraph examiner to testify as to the results of an
examination administered to the defendant. 7 ° The district court based its
decision in part on the nature of the questions that the polygraph examiner
asked."' The first relevant question that the examiner asked the defendant
was whether the defendant had conspired with anyone to send the package
to the Assistant U.S. Attorney." The court concluded that this question
clearly had little probative value because the defendant was not charged
with conspiracy.'" The second relevant question was whether the defendant
sent the package to the Assistant U.S. Attorney. 74 Again, the court con-
cluded that this question had little significance given the charge against the
defendant; the defendant could have answered the question honestly and still
could have constructed the bomb. 75 The court found that the defendant
could have had an innocent third party send the package, and therefore, the
defendant would not have conspired to send the bomb because the third
inherent importance of credibility in such a case. Id. Subsequently, the court issued a
ruling that admitted the polygraph evidence in the absence of a valid prosecutorial reason
for failing to stipulate. Id. at 466; see also Tarlow, supra note 1, at 917 (describing case
in which trial court made implied finding that police officer's version of events was accurate
and defendant's version was not accurate despite seemingly implausible description of events
by officer). Consider a scenario in which a defendant and a police officer are the only wit-
nesses to an alleged crime. For nearly any crime that can be hypothesized, save perhaps some
strict liability offenses (like failing to register for the draft), the credibility of the defendant
and the officer clearly will be the key to the case. Accordingly, under the Sixth Circuit's
precedents regarding the polygraph, the test results may not come into evidence even if there
is other independent evidence either corroborating the defendant's version of the facts or
refuting the police officer's assertions because credibility is still a key issue at the trial.
167. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (excluding polygraph
evidence in large part because phrasing of examiner's questions would mislead and confuse
jury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996).
168. 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995).
169. Kwong, 69 F.3d at 664.
170. Id. at 665.
171. Id. at 668.
172. Id. at 667.
173. See id. at 668 (observing that prosecution did not charge defendant with conspiracy).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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party would have participated unwittingly. 76 Thus, the defendant could
have answered both of the questions truthfully yet still have committed the
crime of the attempted murder of an Assistant U.S. Attorney."7
The Federal Rules of Evidence provided the Second Circuit with the
threshold test.178 The court of appeals noted that despite the relative liberal-
ity of the Rules when compared with the old Frye standard, 7 9 the Rules still
require a showing that the proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and
reliable."8 Rule 702 mandates that the proffered evidence "assist the trier
of fact." '  The court questioned whether the defendant's responses would
help the trier of fact resolve whether the defendant was guilty of the crime
of attempted murder."u Even assuming that the proffered polygraph
evidence would assist the trier of fact, the court concluded that Rule 403
excludes the results of the examinations.'1 The district court determined
that the ambiguity inherent in the examiner's questions would mislead and
confuse the jury, thus outweighing any probative value that the defendant's
responses might have had."
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's assess-
ment and frankly discussed its general perceptions of polygraph evidence."
The court of appeals referred to Posado and noted that the "legal Pandora's
box" opened by the Fifth Circuit in that case was not yet agape in the
176. See id. (stating that defendant could have provided truthful response to second
question of examiner and still have committed crime in question).
177. See id. (noting that defendant could have truthfully answered both questions and
still have committed crime in question). The examiner's first question was whether the
defendant conspired to send the bomb to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, but that question had
no bearing on the charged offense because there is no element of conspiracy necessary in
the crime of attempted murder of an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Id. The defendant also could
have answered the second question truthfully, whether he sent the briefcase that contained
the bomb to the U.S. Attorney, because he could have arranged for someone without




181. See supra note 22 (quoting language of Rule 702).
182. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding polygraph results because admission of those
results would have misled and confused jury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996); see also
supra note 18 (articulating terms of Rule 403).
183. Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 668-69 (describing Posado and how case at issue was not proper forum
to reexamine validity of polygraph examinations under Rule 702).
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Second Circuit." However, the appellate court exhibited a more sympa-
thetic view toward polygraph evidence and explicitly asserted that the
factual record in Kwong simply did not provide a proper opportunity to
revisit the issue of the validity of polygraph evidence.'8
7
C. How District Courts in the Fifth Circuit Interpret Posado
The most interesting aspect of Posado is how district courts in the
Fifth Circuit have applied its rationale. In United States v. Dominguez,189
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas consid-
ered a defendant's motion to introduce polygraph results into evidence. 9'
The district court denied the motion at the Daubert hearing because it
determined that the defendant was not able to clear the Rule 403 threshold
of admissibility. 9'" After the court's denial of the defendant's motion, the
prosecution moved to dismiss the indictment against the defendant.' 92
Nevertheless, because the court believed that the admission of polygraph
test results could pose difficulties in the future, the court decided to issue
a written order providing some guidance through the legal quagmire of
polygraph admissibility. 93
The district court denied the defendant's motion to admit polygraph
results for several reasons. 9" First, the defendant did not invite the prose-
cution to participate during the pre-test and post-test interview process.' 95
Second, the defendant refused to take a Government-sponsored polygraph
unless the prosecution agreed to three demands."9 The first condition was
that the defendant's polygraphist or a representative from his defense team
have the opportunity to observe the proceedings in their entirety. 97 The
186. See id. at 668.
187. See id. at 669 (suggesting that court would not reconsider validity of polygraph
evidence on factual record before it in Kwong, but implying more lenient view toward
polygraph evidence in general).
188. See United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(refusing to allow defendant to introduce polygraph results).
189. 902 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Tex. 1995).




194. Id. at 739-40.
195. Id. at 739.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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second condition was that the Government could not conduct a post-test
interview. 19 The final condition was that the Government would drop all
charges if the defendant passed the Government's polygraph examination. 199
The court found these prerequisites prejudicial and unreasonable, espe-
cially considering the defense examiner's testimony at the Daubert hearing.2w
The examiner testified that subsequent tests are not as reliable as the initial
polygraph examination because the subject usually becomes more acclimated
to the process."° In addition, expert testimony noted that to ensure reliability
the examiner should administer the test to the subject with no other individu-
als present because other individuals could influence how, or if, the subject
answered a question.' Essentially, the court found that the Government
could not conduct a reliable test because of the unreasonable defense restric-
tions.203 In particular, the court indicated that the defense's request that the
Government dismiss all charges if the defendant passed the polygraph was
unduly prejudicial.2m These conditions effectively made the defendant
unavailable for a Government polygraph because a result that corroborated
the defendant's version of the facts would require dismissal of the charges
no matter how compelling other evidence might be against the defendant. 
2
The court concluded that these restrictions had the effect of denying the
Government the opportunity to refute the results of the defense's prior
polygraph examination.' In dicta, the district court took a step toward
interpreting Posado by articulating ten factors relevant to the determination
of when a polygraph test's probative value substantially outweighs its preju-
dicial effect.' Thus, the Dominguez decision is noteworthy because the
Southern District of Texas provided a more specific analysis of the highly
subjective Rule 403 test in the context of polygraph evidence. 2 8
The ten relevant factors that the Dominguez court would have considered
when deciding whether proffered polygraph evidence had sufficient probative
value to ensure that it passed the Rule 403 threshold were:










208. See id. (describing ten relevant factors in Rule 403 balancing test).
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(1) that the parties have the opportunity to observe the proceedings; 2 9
(2) that the parties make a binding commitment to allow either side to
admit the results of the examination;
210
(3) that the subject agree to be examined by a polygraph expert that the
opposing party designates; 2
(4) when the parties contemplate more than one examination, that the
choice of who conducts the first examination take place by chance;
212
(5) that all parties have the opportunity to attend the pre-test interview;
2 13
(6) that all parties have the opportunity to attend the post-test inter-
view;
214
(7) that the subject agree to be examined to ensure that he or she did not
have any drugs or sedatives in his or her body at the time of the
exam;
2 15
(8) that any rule that prohibits character evidence for truthfulness be
waived;
216
(9) that the examiner not ask questions regarding the mental state of the
defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime; 217 and
(10) that the failure of the defendant to make himself or herself available
to testify in the case be considered.218
The court concluded that a party need not meet all of these factors before it
would admit polygraph results, but the court would weigh these considera-







213. Id.; see also GLANNELU & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 219 (noting importance
of pre-test interview generally and describing functions of pre-test interview, which include
acquainting subject with effectiveness of technique, assessing suitability of subject to testing,
and formulating test questions with subject's assistance during interview).
214. United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
215. Id. But see Raskin, supra note 80, at 49-50 (asserting that drug use during
commission of crime may adversely affect polygraph test accuracy, but noting that no
support exists for idea that drugs injected before taking polygraph help defeat examination).
216. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740.
217. Id.; see also Raskin, supra note 80, at 46-47 (claiming that polygraph examinations
that address specific factual issues produce more valid results than those that involve mental
state issues).
218. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740.
219. Id.
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The factors have many interesting dynamics.' For example, the court
specifically explained that its first factor - that all parties have the opportu-
nity to observe the proceedings - was not meant to imply that all parties
must be in the room at the time of the examination." Rather, the court
suggested that both parties need to make arrangements so that they have
representatives observing the proceedings through the use of hidden video
cameras or similar devices.'"
The court responded to the testimony of a polygraph expert in formu-
lating factors number four and number seven.' Factor four, regarding
choice of the first examiner, probably was a result of the defendant's expert
testifying that no examination is as accurate as the first polygraph examina-
tion.? The seventh factor, whether to allow sedative or drug testing of the
subject immediately prior to the polygraph, resulted from testimony by the
defendant's expert that drugs or sedatives of any type could cause mislead-
ing or incorrect results.'
The eighth factor, which suggested waiver of any rule prohibiting the
introduction of character evidence for truthfulness, implicitly addresses
a potential problem with admitting polygraph evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' Some courts accept polygraph-related testimony
under the theory that polygraph results should be admitted because they
can bolster a defendant's credibility in the face of an accusation by the
government.' This theory is fine in the abstract, but Rule 608 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence applies to the situation.' Rule 608(a)(2) states
220. See infra notes 221-37 (describing interesting repercussions of Dominguez court's
ten factors).
221. See United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 740 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(stating that representatives need not be in room, but rather ought to watch proceedings
through other available means).
222. Id.
223. Compare id. at 740 (describing how defendant's expert testified that first polygraph
examination is always most reliable and that drugs could cause misleading or incorrect results),
with id. (listing as two of ten factors requirement that choice of first examiner be random and
that subject be tested for drugs prior to examination).
224. See id. (describing how defendant's expert testified that first polygraph examination
given is always most reliable examination and later noting that court considered this idea when
listing its ten factors to consider under Rule 403 balancing).
225. Id. at 739.
226. See id. at 740 n.8 (discussing Rule 608 and how specific instances of witness's con-
duct, other than conviction of crime as Rule 609 provides, are not admissible for purpose of
attacking or supporting witness's credibility).
227. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995) (asserting that defen-
dants wanted to introduce polygraph results to corroborate their version of events in question).
228. See supra note 19 (quoting terms of 608(a)).
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that a court may admit evidence of a witness's truthful character only after
the opposing party has attacked the witness's character for truthfulness.229
Further, as noted by the Dominguez court in a footnote, Rule 608(b) does
not allow specific instances of a witness's conduct into evidence for the
purpose of bolstering or attacking that witness's credibility.3" The Domin-
guez court's answer to this conceptual problem was to suggest that the
parties involved agree prior to the polygraph test to waive the applicable
Federal Rules of Evidence that prohibit character evidence of truthful-
ness
.2 1
The ninth factor articulated by the Dominguez court was that the expert
could not ask questions that related to the mental state of the defendant at
the time of the alleged crime. 1 2 Arguably, this factor is merely the court's
method of ensuring that both parties observe Rule 704.13 Rule 704(b)
states that an expert witness may not state an opinion or an inference as to
whether the accused possessed the mental state necessary to fulfill an
element of a crime or a defense to a crime.' Without this disclaimer, a
party might lose sight of Rule 704(b) and attempt to have a polygraphist
testify to the defendant's state of mind." Further, some polygraph experts
assert that polygraph examinations which address specific factual issues
produce more valid results than those that involve the mental state issue.26
Thus, the district court likely articulated its ninth factor to ensure accuracy
and to provide notice to future defendants that they cannot use the poly-
229. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(2) (describing how "evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise").
230. See United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 740 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(addressing impact of Rule 608(b) in context of factors court previously enunciated); supra
notes 188-219 and accompanying text (providing discussion of Dominguez); see also FED. R.
EVID. 608(b) (stating that "[s]pecific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence").
23 1. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740.
232. Id.
233. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b) (noting that "no expert witness testifying with respect to
the mental state or condition of the defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or infer-
ence as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting
an element of the crime charged").
234. Id.
235. See United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 740 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(suggesting distinction between polygraph evidence generally and polygraph evidence that goes
to issue of defendant's state of mind).
236. See Raskin, supra note 80, at 47-48 (noting that polygraph test should not require
subject to draw inference or legal conclusion concerning alleged event, such as whether there
was consent in sexual assault case).
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graph as a method to circumvent Rule 704(b) by interjecting otherwise
inadmissible evidence into a trial or a hearing. 37
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
took a slightly different view of Posado in Ulmer v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co." In Ulmer, the court considered whether to admit polygraph
evidence that supported homeowners' claims that they did not commit
arson. 9 After a fire destroyed their home and personal property, the home-
owners filed a formal claim of damages with their insurance company.'
The insurer, State Farm, refused to pay the damages and alleged that the
homeowners caused the fire.241
The Louisiana State Fire Marshal investigated the plaintiffs as a result
of State Farm's arson accusations. 242 An investigator with the Fire Marshal's
office requested that the plaintiffs undergo polygraph examinations, to which
the plaintiffs agreed.243 A certified polygraphist administered the test with
the Fire Marshal investigator present, and the polygraphist determined that
the examination results supported the plaintiffs' contentions that they were
not responsible for the fire.2 Consequently, the Fire Marshal concluded
that insufficient evidence existed to warrant further investigation of the
plaintiffs' possible role in the fire. 245 Although the Fire Marshal released the
investigation and the polygraph examination results to State Farm, the
company still refused to pay any benefits owed under the policy.216 The
policyholders sued State Farm for breach of contract and for breach of an
insurer's statutory duty to deal in good faith with insured parties. 247
The district court began its analysis by noting that the Fifth Circuit
abandoned its per se exclusionary rule regarding polygraph evidence in
Posado.248 The Ulmer court enunciated Posado's three-step approach toward
polygraph evidence.249 The district court articulated the initial Rule 104(a)
237. See Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740 n.8 (suggesting that polygraph evidence that
goes to state of mind has less value generally).
238. 897 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1995).









248. Id. at 301.
249. Id.
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reliability inquiry, which included the four Rule 702 factors that the Daubert
Court mentioned in its analysis.'50 Applying the Posado framework to the
facts, the Ulmer court concluded that the polygraph examinations were
sufficiently reliable to meet the threshold of admissibility. 251 The defendants
argued that the polygraph results were not reliable because (1) the plaintiffs
failed to provide the examiner's report as the district court ordered, and
(2) the plaintiffs failed to list an expert - other than the administering
polygraphist - who could testify regarding the reliability of polygraphs
generally and of this examination in particular.352 The court noted that
polygraph experts review polygraph theory and technique extensively and
that such experts have concluded that the examinations have a reasonable
potential rate of error5 3 Further, the court noted that the Fire Marshal
requested the examinations and required a government employee to adminis-
ter and interpret the examinations354 These facts bolstered the examinations'
reliability in the court's eyes,255 and therefore, the district court found the
proffered evidence reliable within the terms of Rule 702 as interpreted by
Daubert and Posado. 
256
The second step in the process required the Ulmer court to determine
the relevance of the proffered evidence.3 The court noted that the Rule 401
relevance inquiry may be a pro forma inquiry in the case of polygraph
evidence; if the polygraph technique at issue in the case accurately measures
truthfulness, then relevance is not at issue." s After resolving the reliability
inquiry, the district court quickly dismissed any concerns about relevance by
referencing Rule 401's low standard for admissibility.5 9
250. See id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993)
(articulating four factors in Rule 702 inquiry); supra note 15 (quoting terms of Rule 104(a)).
251. Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 301 (W.D. La. 1995).
252. Id. at 302.
253. See id. (indicating that under controlled conditions polygraph technique accurately
predicts truth or deception between 70% and 90% of the time). But see Rex Beaber, Not
Guilty by Reason of Polygraph, 16 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 27, 34 (1984) (asserting that
polygraph accuracy rate is no greater than 50%).
254. See Ulner, 897 F. Supp. at 302 (noting that government employee, rather than
polygraphist employed by one party, administered examinations).
255. Id. (asserting that proffered testimony is supported by sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity to satisfy Rule 702 as interpreted in Daubert and Posado).
256. See id. at 303.
257. See id. (interpreting Posado to make relevance inquiry under Rule 401 mere
formality once court determined that evidence met more exacting Rule 104(a) reliability
inquiry).
258. Id. at 301-02.
259. See id. at 302-03 (making conclusory statement that because polygraph examina-
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The third aspect of the Posado test - Rule 403 balancing - provided
the bulk of the analysis in the Ulmer decision.' The court first addressed
State Farm's claim that it faced a higher risk of prejudice because it did not
have the opportunity to participate in the examinations or to select the
examiner. 6' The court responded by noting that the plaintiffs - the home-
owners - did not "select" the polygraphist and that the administering poly-
graphist had no interest in the outcome. 62 The court concluded that the
circumstances surrounding the administration of the polygraph tests weighed
in favor of admissibility.'
However, the district court also identified a factor that weighed against
the introduction of the polygraph evidence. 26I The court noted that a jury
would hear the proffered polygraph evidence, as opposed to the situation in
Posado, in which the defendant attempted to offer the evidence before a
judge at a suppression hearing.'e The court determined that this distinction
weighed in favor of exclusion. 266 The court further noted that if such a
factor was dispositive by itself, then Rule 403 would prohibit introduction of
polygraph evidence in jury trials; thus, the Fifth Circuit's explicit shift in
Posado was meaningless in such cases.'
Finally, the court found a special need for the evidence because of the
facts in this case. 2" Because the state Fire Marshal's office chose to close
the investigation, independent evidence supported the plaintiffs' version of
the events.69 The court concluded that the polygraph results were not
merely tiebreaker evidence and that this factor therefore weighed in favor of
admissibility.' 7 After considering all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the proffered polygraph evidence, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs could question the polygraphist and Fire Marshal investigator
tions presumptively were reliable under Rule 702 and standards set forth in Posado, exami-
nations, therefore, must be relevant under Rule 401).
260. See id. at 301-04 (analyzing at length competing factors under Rule 403 that counsel
for and against admitting polygraph evidence).
261. Id. at 303.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 303-04.
265. Id. at 304.
266. Id.; see also supra notes 58-128 and accompanying text (discussing Posado generally
and specific procedural aspects of case).
267. Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 303-04 (W.D. La. 1995).
268. See id. at 304 (describing Rule 403 factor of special need and how findings of state
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regarding both the administered examinations and the results obtained from
the plaintiffs."
IV. The Fallacies That Underlie the Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence
As evidenced by existing case law, most courts refuse to admit poly-
graph evidence.2z The rationale behind the exclusion is twofold.'z Oppo-
nents of admissibility argue that polygraph evidence has an unacceptably high
error rate and, additionally, that the evidence has an undue influence on the
jury.?74 A third criticism of polygraph evidence appears in the criminal
context? 5 The "friendly polygrapher theory," posited by psychiatrist Martin
Orne, suggests that when a defense-sponsored examiner administers a unilat-
eral polygraph test, a guilty subject is more likely to pass the test because the
polygraphist will report only favorable results.76 Although all three of these
theories seem plausible, the existing data simply provide no support.'m
271. Id.
272. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 232 (noting that majority of
jurisdictions still exclude polygraph evidence regularly).
273. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166-69 (8th Cir. 1975) (asserting that
there is not sufficient scientific reliability to warrant admission of results of polygraph exami-
nation and that when polygraph evidence is offered, it is "likely to be shrouded with an aura
of near infallibility"); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512-14 (D. Md. 1973) (chal-
lenging reliability of polygraph evidence and asserting that technology is in "incipient stage of
experimental research"); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scien-
tific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554,
564 (1982-1983) (asserting that two primary criticisms motivate exclusion of scientific evi-
dence). It is worth noting that few federal courts explicitly have articulated these concerns
since the mid-1970s, when many empirical studies indicated that these concerns were misplaced.
274. See Imwinkelried, supra note 273, at 564 (describing high level of error and jury's
inability to evaluate complex testimony as two primary reasons for excluding scientific evi-
dence).
275. See Raskin, supra note 80, at 60 (articulating "friendly polygrapher" theory that
guilty subject is more likely to "beat" polygraph test when subject takes defense-sponsored
examination because defendant does not fear adverse outcome, as polygraph results can only
bolster case).
276. See id. (citing Martin Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection
of Deception, in LEGAL AmISSTBiLITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 94 (N. Ansley ed., 1975) (describ-
ing "friendly polygraphist" theory)).
277. See Imwinkelried, supra note 273, at 564-68 (listing studies asserting that eyewitness
testimonial error is as frequent as, and less controllable than, scientific testimony, as well as
studies which assert that jurors frequently reject polygraph testimony and return verdicts
inconsistent with polygraphist's testimony); Polizzi, supra note 79, at 399 (noting that
polygraph evidence is at least as reliable as eyewitness testimony and that it has acceptable
error rate); Raskin, supra note 80, at 61-66 (concluding first that scientific literature contra-
dicts rather than supports "friendly polygrapher" theory generally, and second, that available
evidence indicates that polygraph evidence does not have undue influence on trier of fact).
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Focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of polygraph evidence in the
abstract is misleading. 8 Whenever a court excludes polygraph testimony,
the court relies on other evidence to resolve the issue addressed by the
polygraph evidence.Y 9 Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is not whether
polygraph evidence is reliable given its error rate, but rather whether the
evidence is reliable when compared with other types of evidence that courts
routinely admit.'
A. The Reliability Argument
Although reported error rates for polygraph examinations vary, most
observers concede an accuracy rate of at least eighty percent for polygraph
examinations. 1 In contrast, researchers consistently find a high level of
error in lay eyewitness identification testimony.' For example, a psycholo-
gist staged a simulated crime on a televised newscast and asked the viewing
audience to identify the perpetrator from a lineup shortly after the event.'
Of the 2145 viewers who responded, only fifteen percent correctly identified
the perpetrator.' This figure is roughly equivalent to the percentage of
viewers who could identify the perpetrator by guessing.' Additionally,
278. See Imwinkelried, supra note 273, at 564 (asserting that critics of scientific evidence
generally are misguided when they analyze scientific evidence without comparing it to other
types of evidence).
279. See id. (describing how exclusion of some evidence necessarily encourages reliance
on other forms of evidence).
280. Id.
281. See Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 404 (5th Cir. 1989) (asserting
that, by most accounts, polygraph examinations correctly detect truth or deception 80% to 90%
of time); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1395 n.12 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting studies of
accuracy of polygraph results and noting that even most ardent polygraph detractors cite
accuracy rates of 70%); Raskin, supra note 80, at 72 (claiming that existing literature suggests
accuracy rate of 90% or higher when law enforcement officials conduct examinations to assess
the credibility of suspects in criminal investigations).
282. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFrUS, EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY 8-19 (1979) (compiling
empirical data on eyewitness testimony and generally describing inaccuracies associated with
such testimony); A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 228
(1979) (asserting that societal trust in accuracy of eyewitness accounts is misplaced); Robert
Buckhout & Mark Greenwald, Witness Psychology, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
1291, 1298 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed. 1981) (describing author Buckhout's staging
of simulated crime on televised newscast). After the simulated crime, 2145 viewers called in
to try to identify the perpetrator from a lineup, yet only 14.7%, a figure roughly at the chance
or guessing level, made the correct identification. Id.
283. See Buckhout & Greenwald, supra note 282, at 1298 (describing nature of simulated
crime and results obtained from viewing public).
284. Id.
285. Id.
POSADO AND THE POLYGRAPH
other types of routinely admitted lay testimony, such as excited utterances,
which are admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception of Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(2),' have a high probability of inaccuracy.3 7 Further, the
level of error in lay testimony is intractable, and very little can be done to
aid the human processes of perception and memory.u8 In contrast, most of
the error in polygraph results is attributable to the training and competence
of the examiners, a readily curable problem. 29
Not only do courts accept eyewitness testimony despite its inherent
unreliability,29 but courts frequently accept scientific evidence other than
polygraph evidence so long as the scientific principles that support the expert
testimony are reliable enough to ensure acceptably probative results. 29' For
example, courts admit the results of Breathalyzer tests, radar speed-checking
devices, various forensic tests, and neutron activation tests despite disagree-
ment in the scientific community over how reliable the test results are. 292
Generally, courts admit scientific test results if they are "reliable enough to
be probative" or if they provide "an aid to the jury."293 In the case of poly-
286. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (describing admissibility of excited utterances pursuant to
hearsay exceptions).
287. Compare I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of
Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 28 (noting
that theory of admissibility of excited utterances under hearsay exceptions is faulty and that
likelihood of inaccurate perception is high), with, e.g., Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883
F.2d 400, 404 (5th Cir. 1989) (asserting that polygraph results are accurate between 80% and
90% of time).
288. See Imwinkelried, supra note 273, at 566 (noting inherent limitations of human
perception and memory).
289. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (asserting that
remaining controversy about accuracy of polygraph tests is attributed almost unanimously to
variations in surrounding environment and qualifications of examiner).
290. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text (discussing high probability of error
in eyewitness testimony).
291. See Tarlow, supra note 1, at 938 (noting that courts which consider admissibility of
most types of scientific evidence require only that expert testimony is reliable enough to insure
reasonably probative results).
292. See id. at 938-39 n.107 (describing other types of scientific evidence and how
apparent judicial hostility is maiifested in higher threshold for admissibility of polygraph).
For example, Tarlow discusses cases in which a court rejected proffered polygraph testimony
based on the general acceptance theory while accepting Breathalyzer testimony despite the fact
that the expert witness in the Breathalyzer case admitted that some scientists disagree with its
accuracy. Id. The court concluded that in the case of the Breathalyzer, the differing opinions
regarding accuracy went to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility generally.
Id. Tarlow describes a similar pattern in the case of voiceprint analysis, id., radar speedome-
ters, id. at 939, various forensic tests, id., and neutron activation tests. Id.
293. Id. at 939.
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graph evidence, results often meet this low threshold, yet courts still tend to
exclude the evidence.' 9
B. The Undue Influence Argument
The second major criticism of polygraph evidence is that jurors will
attach too much weight to the proffered evidence and will not consider the
evidence in its totality when reaching a verdict.2' In fact, most of the
empirical data support the contrary position.2% A survey of the use of poly-
graph evidence in 220 cases in Wisconsin led one commentator to conclude
that polygraph evidence does not assume undue influence in the evidentiary
scheme.219 Of the 220 cases, only eleven actually went to trial, and the court
admitted the relevant polygraph evidence pursuant to a stipulation between
the parties.29 In the one case in which the polygraph examination results
indicated that the defendant was truthful when he or she denied commission
of the crime, the jury chose to convict in spite of the proffered polygraph
results.' In the other ten cases - in which the test indicated deception on
294. See id. (asserting that courts should admit polygraph evidence under probative
value standard, but usually do not admit such evidence).
295. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (expressing
concern that polygraph results offered into evidence are likely to be "shrouded with an aura
of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi"); Michael Abbell, Polygraph
Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal Trials, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
29, 53 (1977) (asserting that use of polygraph machine lends degree of scientific objectivity
that will mislead jurors into giving undue weight to polygraph examinations).
296. See, e.g., Frederic J. Barnett, How Does a Jury View Polygraph Examination
Results?, 2 POLYGRAPH 275, 276 (1973) (describing interviews with jurors in criminal case
who heard testimony from qualified experts concerning likelihood of accuracy of polygraph
examination and how jurors gave no formal consideration to polygraph evidence in reaching
verdict of not guilty); Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 117, 123-
24 (1980) (indicating that polygraph evidence only slightly influenced jurors, especially
when court gave jurors cautionary instruction stating that polygraphs only had 80% accuracy
rate); Robert B. Peters, A Survey of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 A.B.A. J.
162, 165 (1982) (noting that results from 220-case sample in Wisconsin indicated that
polygraph evidence can be presented in such manner that evidence does not assume undue
influence in evidentiary scheme, and that in survey of nineteen lawyers involved in these
cases, seventeen felt that polygraph evidence was "reasonable and intelligible," whereas only
four felt that jury "disregarded significant evidence because of the polygraph testimony");
Tarlow, supra note 1, at 968 n.258 (1975) (noting that jurors frequently reject polygraph
evidence and return verdicts inconsistent with polygraphist's testimony).
297. See Peters, supra note 296, at 164 (concluding that polygraph evidence did not
assume undue influence in Wisconsin case sample).
298. Id.
299. Id.
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the defendant's part - the jury voted to convict nine times and voted to
acquit once."° Nineteen of the twenty-two attorneys involved in those trials
also participated in an independent survey following resolution of all the
cases."' Seventeen of the attorneys believed that the polygraph testimony
was reasonable and intelligible; only four concluded that the trier of fact
disregarded significant evidence because of the polygraph testimony.
3o2
Another empirical study indicated that polygraph evidence only slightly
influenced a group of simulated jurors and that the group of subjects weighed
the polygraph evidence rather than blindly accepting it.303 Further, when the
court gave a cautionary statement and noted that polygraph evidence was
accurate only about eighty percent of the time, the authors found that the
simulated jurors weighed the polygraph evidence with greater reservations. 304
The authors concluded that jurisdictions that presently exclude polygraph
evidence should reconsider the appropriateness of their approaches.
305
In another study, an attorney interviewed eight members of a postverdict
jury to determine the role that the polygraph test results played in delibera-
tions.3° The polygraph results supported the defendant's contention that he
had not committed the alleged crime. 301 The interviewed jurors indicated
that, despite the fact that several highly qualified experts testified as to the
validity of the polygraph technique, the jurors did not consider the test
results in rendering a verdict. 18 In fact, the jurors stated that they resolved
the case based on other evidence that the defendant presented at trial.3 9 A
separate simulated experiment found that jurors spent only four percent of
their deliberation time discussing polygraph evidence and that some jurors




303. See Cavoukian & Heslegrave, supra note 296, at 123-24, 127 (asserting that
subjects of survey considered polygraph evidence in light of other existing evidence instead
of blindly accepting it).
304. See id. at 124 (noting that judge's cautionary ruling that polygraph evidence is
accurate only roughly 80% of time mitigated effect associated with inclusion of polygraph
results).
305. See id. at 131 (concluding with statement that polygraph evidence may raise
reasonable doubt as to whether party committed act in question, but that it would not, in
authors' opinion, raise unreasonable doubt).
306. See Barnett, supra note 296, at 276 (describing interviews with jurors).
307. Id. at 275.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Alan Markwart & Brian E. Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock
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spend little or no deliberation time discussing polygraph results, it is difficult
to argue that the evidence has undue influence.
In 1983, the Supreme Court of New Mexico adopted a provision for the
use of polygraph evidence in its courts after concluding that the polygraph
was a useful tool. 311  New Mexico Rule of Evidence 707 requires that
polygraph examiners have minimum qualifications, 312 regulates the admissi-
bility of results,313 and regulates the notice required for polygraph examina-
tions.314 Since the adoption of Rule 707, the quality of the polygraph evi-
dence offered and admitted in New Mexico courts has improved, and the
frequency of polygraph testimony has decreased. 5
Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMiN. 324, 329 (1979) (describing how tape
recordings of jury deliberations in simulated felony-murder trial documented how little time
jurors devoted to polygraph evidence).
311. See N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(B)-(B) (describing minimum qualifications of polygraph
examiner, admissibility of polygraph results, required notice of examination, and required
recording of pre-test interview and actual testing).
312. See N.M. R. EvID. 11-707(B) (articulating minimum qualifications of examiner).
The minimum qualifications for an examiner in New Mexico include at least five years
experience in administration or interpretation of polygraphs (or equivalent academic training)
conducted in accordance with other provisions of Rule 707 and completion of at least twenty
hours of continuing education in the field of polygraph examinations during the twelve
month period prior to the administration of the examination. Id.
313. See N.M. R. EVmD. 11-707(C) (noting that opinion of polygraph examiner may,
at trial judge's discretion, be admitted as evidence of truthfulness of any person called as
witness if examiner who performed test is qualified as expert within terms of rule and other
conditions are met). Assuming the examiner is qualified, polygraph results are admissible
pursuant to Rule 11-707 if. (1) the polygraph examination was conducted in accordance with
the provisions of this rule; (2) the polygraph examination was quantitatively scored in a
manner that is generally accepted as reliable by polygraph experts; (3) prior to conducting
the polygraph examination the polygraph examiner was informed as to the examinee's
background, health, education and other relevant information; (4) at least two relevant
questions were asked during the examination; and (5) at least three charts were taken of the
examinee. Id.
314. See N.M. R. EvID. 11-707(D) (requiring any party who intends to introduce
polygraph evidence at trial to serve opposing party written notice of such intent not less than
thirty days before trial). In addition to providing notice, a party that wishes to introduce
polygraph results is responsible for delivering to its adversarial party: (1) a copy of the
polygraph examiner's report, if any; (2) a copy of each chart; (3) a copy of the audio or
video recording of the pretest interview; and (4) a list of any prior polygraph examinations
taken by the examinee in the matter under question, including the names of all persons
administering such examinations, and the dates and the results of the examinations. Id.
315. See Raskin, supra note 80, at 72 (describing trend of higher quality of polygraph
evidence in court and decreased use of polygraph testimony generally since New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted Rule 707).
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C. The Friendly Polygrapher Theory
Finally, a major challenge to defense-sponsored, unilaterally obtained
polygraph evidence in criminal cases is psychiatrist Martin Orne's friendly
polygrapher hypothesis.316 Under this theory, when a defense-sponsored
examiner administers a polygraph test on a confidential basis, a guilty subject
is more likely to beat the test than if the individual who administers the
examination is independent and reports the results regardless of whether the
results are favorable or adverse.317 The premise of Orne's theory is that if
the subject anticipates the disclosure of favorable results, then the subject
will have more confidence because an adverse outcome will not harm the
subject's case. 18
Dr. David Raskin asserts that Orne's hypothesis is illogical in the con-
text of criminal cases for two reasons.319 First, subjects have no assurance
that the polygraphist will not disclose adverse results.3" Second, subjects do
have a stake in the outcome of the examination because they might obtain a
dismissal of the charges if they pass the polygraph test.32 Failing the test,
however, could lead to increased legal costs and personal stressY.3  Thus,
although the friendly polygrapher theory may sound reasonable, scientific
literature generally contradicts it.
31
V. A Constitutional Perspective as to Why Polygraph Evidence
Should Be Admissible
Supporters of polygraph admissibility claim that a defendant's constitu-
tional right to present a defense mandates the introduction of favorable
316. See id. at 60 (articulating and explaining friendly polygrapher theory and its
origins).
317. See id. (describing assumptions of friendly polygrapher theory) (citing Martin
Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, in LEGAL
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 94 (N. Ansley ed., 1975)).
318. Id. at 61.
319. See id. at 62 (describing how basic premise of friendly polygrapher hypothesis is
flawed because subjects have no assurance that adverse results will not be disclosed and





323. See id. (asserting that existing scientific literature does not support friendly poly-
graphist hypothesis); Howard W. Timm, Effect of Altered Outcome Expectancies Stemming
from Placebo and Feedback Treatments on the Validity of the Guilty Knowledge Technique,
67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 391, 397 (1982) (describing how results of study did not support
Orne's friendly polygraphist theory).
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polygraph results into court.u Although a New Mexico appellate court has
found that a defendant has a due process right to present critical and reliable
defense evidence in the form of polygraph evidence, 3' few federal courts
have accepted this argument.3"s
The procedural due process argument originated in 1973, when the
Supreme Court concluded that exclusionary rules are subject to stricter
review when they conflict with a criminal defendant's due process rights and
when a state's policy justification is not substantial. 3 7 Applying this ratio-
nale to polygraph evidence leads to the conclusion that when the examination
results are reliable and relevant within the terms of Rule 104(a) and are
critical to the accused's defense, then the accused has a due process right to
present the results absent a compelling state justification for exclusion.3s
324. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 242 (noting that some polygraph
supporters believe that constitutional right to present defense mandates introduction of exculp-
atory polygraph evidence).
325. See New Mexico v. Dorsey, 532 P.2d 912, 914-15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974), (finding
that district court exclusion of polygraph evidence was error when reliability of polygraph
examination was not in question, defendant's credibility was central to case, and polygraph
results indicated that defendant was telling truth with respect to his claim of self-defense even
though state refused to stipulate to tests before trial), 4f"d on other grounds, 539 P.2d 204
(N.M. 1975).
326. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 243 (noting that limited number
of courts accept constitutional argument and that there is little precedential value in cases in
which courts did accept constitutional argument). But see McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458,
466 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that prosecution's refusal to stipulate to polygraph results without
offering valid ground for refusal violated due process because state law admitted stipulated
polygraph results); Jackson v. Garrison, 495 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (finding that
exclusion of polygraph evidence denied defendant fair trial), rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.
1981).
327. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-03 (1973) (determining that
Mississippi trial court's application of traditional hearsay rules deprived criminal defendant of
opportunity to confront adverse witness effectively and to introduce exculpatory probative
evidence and therefore violated his due process rights).
328. See Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 814 (1976) (noting that admission of
polygraph evidence to substantiate defendant's veracity or to discredit government witness
would be compelled in most cases because such evidence usually is critical and outweighs
government concern of unreliability of polygraph results, especially given (1) volume of
literature which indicates that polygraphs are accurate at least 70% of time and (2) less
restrictive alternative of allowing prosecution to cross-examine and offer rebuttal evidence to
discredit accused's polygraph results); Thomas K. Downs, Note, Admission of Polygraph
Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55 IND. L.J. 157, 166 (1979) (noting how extrapolation
from Chambers suggests that defendant has due process right to present exculpatory polygraph
results absent sufficiently compelling countervailing state interest); Debra S. Katz, Note, State
v. Dean: A Compulsory Process Analysis of the Inadmissibility of Polygraph Evidence, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 237, 274 (concluding that once polygraph evidence is shown to be reliable and
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Most federal courts have refused to accept such a theory,3 29 and they con-
tinue to hold polygraph evidence inadmissible absent a stipulation between
the parties. 330 However, a few notable opinions seem to adopt a compulsory
process rationale toward the admissibility of polygraph evidence. 331
In Jackson v. Garrison,332 a defendant sought to introduce favorable
polygraph results in an effort to bolster his credibility.333 Two extremely
critical within factual context of case, state rule mandating exclusion absent stipulation between
parties may be unconstitutional under due process analysis); Paul Thomas, Comment, Compul-
sory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does Exclusion Violate a Criminal Defendant's Due
Process Rights?, 12 CONN. L. REv. 324, 351 (1980) (asserting that absent compelling state
interest which can be furthered only by exclusion, courts should admit polygraph on behalf of
most criminal defendants under Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Timothy J.
Walsh, Comment, Polygraph Admission Through Compulsory Process, 16 AKRON L. REv.
761, 780 (1983) (concluding that compulsory process clause applies to defendant's exculpatory
polygraph evidence absent compelling state interest for exclusion).
329. See, e.g., Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting broad
proposition that there is constitutional right to present polygraph evidence); United States v.
Gordon, 688 F.2d 42, 44-45 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); Milano v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 374, 375
(4th Cir. 1981) (same); Jackson v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 1981) (same);
United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 867 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Conner v. Auger, 595
F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir.
1978) (same).
330. See United States v. Black, 684 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
federal prosecutor's unexplained refusal to stipulate to polygraph test, in light of overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt, did not violate due process); Conner v. Auger, 595 F.2d 407,
411 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that trial court's exclusion of unstipulated polygraph evidence did
not deprive defendant of fair trial).
331. See McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981) (determining that
prosecutor violated due process when, acting in adversarial capacity, he exercised unfettered
discretion in refusing to stipulate to polygraph examination that could have produced significant
exculpatory evidence without providing appropriate reason for refusal on record); Jackson v.
Garrison, 495 F. Supp. 9, 11 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (deciding that exclusion of polygraph evidence
denied defendant constitutional right to fair trial), rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981).
332. 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979).
333. See Jackson, 495 F. Supp. at 11 (concluding that exclusion of polygraph evidence
denied defendant fair trial). In Jackson, a North Carolina trial court refused to allow the
defendant to introduce testimony at his trial for robbery which indicated that he successfully
had passed numerous polygraph examinations. Id. at 10. Subsequently, the jury convicted
the defendant of robbery, and the defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus. Id. The district
court first noted that Claude Gilliken, the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation's chief
polygraph examiner from 1963 to 1975, administered three examinations to the defendant at
the request of J. Mac Boxley of the North Carolina Board of Parole. Id. All three tests
indicated that there was no deception in the defendant's negative responses to questions
directed at his possible involvement in a robbery. Id. Frank Faulk, a retired chief polygraph
examiner for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and a former president of the
APA, also examined the defendant at the request of the Attorney General of South Carolina
in connection with an extradition request. Id. Faulk concluded that the defendant truthfully
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well-qualified polygraphists administered the examinations.3 34 However, a
North Carolina court refused to allow the polygraphists to testify, and the
jury convicted the defendant. 335 On appeal, the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina considered whether the state
court's exclusion of the exculpatory polygraph evidence deprived the defen-
dant of a fair trial.336 The district court noted that the two individuals who
administered the polygraph examinations tested the defendant because of
third-party requests, not at the request of defense counsel. 337 The court fur-
ther noted that the polygraphists had impressive credentials: one of the poly-
graphists was a former president of the American Polygraph Association. 
338
Both polygraphists indicated that the responses to polygraph examinations are
ninety-five percent to ninety-six percent accurate for individuals of normal
intelligence.339 The court analogized the polygraph to many other mechanical
devices, such as speedometers and thermometers, and noted that society
relies on these and many other mechanical instruments to make routine
decisions regarding speed, distance, and other measures,m despite the fact
that nearly all of these machines have failures or shortcomings. 341 The court
asserted that a machine's shortcomings go only to the weight of the mechani-
responded to all questions. Id. Both examiners indicated that for individuals of average
intelligence, polygraph responses are 95% to 96% accurate. Id. The court mentioned that
under the most recent case on polygraph evidence in North Carolina, the court excluded
evidence because it was not reliable enough. Id. The district court responded to this criticism
by noting that a polygraph, like the speedometer, the thermometer, and even the eyeball, is
a device that reads or observes data and enables the operator to come to a conclusion. Id. at
11. Further, the court asserted that everyone relies on these types of instruments every day,
and that none of them, especially the human eye, is infallible. Id. In fact, the human eye is
far less than 95% accurate. Id. The court concluded that the failures and shortcomings of
these devices are weighed accordingly by the court, but such weighing does not decide the
question whether they should come into evidence generally. Id. In the case of polygraph
evidence, the court noted that the polygraph reading is at least as reliable as many other
methods of proving that someone is lying, such as reputation, shiftiness of eyes, or clarity
of gaze; thus, it is unfair not to allow a jury to consider polygraph evidence assuming the
court gives a proper limiting instruction. Id. Therefore, because polygraph evidence was at
least as reliable as many other methods for determining honesty, the court concluded that
excluding the polygraph evidence deprived the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair
trial. Id. at 12.
334. Id. at 11.
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cal evidence rather than to its general admissibility.' The court concluded
that the polygraph is more reliable than many of the accepted ways of trying
to prove that an individual is lying, such as reputation evidence, shiftiness
of eyes, or clarity of gaze. 3 Therefore, the court ruled that there was no
reason to withhold the evidence from the jury so long as the court gave a
limiting instruction to the jury.? 4 The court noted that in a factual context
in which the defendant's whole defense is an alibi, excluding the polygraph
evidence deprives the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial345
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
Jackson decision on appeal.? The court of appeals determined that the
results were inadmissible under existing North Carolina law.M7 The Fourth
Circuit ruled that the state court's decision to exclude the evidence did not
violate the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.?"
In McMorris v. Israel, 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered a case in which the prosecution accused the
defendant of committing strong-arm robbery.35 The prosecution had a single
witness to the crime, the victim, who testified that the attacker pushed him
from behind, took his wallet, and shoved him to the ground. 351 In court, the
victim identified the defendant as his assailant, yet admitted on cross-exami-
342. Id.
343. Id. at 11.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Jackson v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'g 495 F. Supp. 9
(W.D.N.C. 1979).
347. See id. at 372 (deciding that failure to admit polygraph results did not deprive
defendant of fair trial and reversing district court decision); supra note 333 (providing factual
background of case). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the polygraph results were
inadmissible under North Carolina law. Jackson, 677 F.2d at 373. In addition, the court
found that restricting the admission of polygraph evidence was a matter of state procedure
rather than an issue of federal constitutional law. Id. Thus, the court ruled that the exclusion
of the polygraph evidence did not negate the fundamental fairness of the petitioner's trial or
violate any constitutional right. Id.
348. Id. at 373-74.
349. 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981).
350. See McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that prosecutor
violated due process when, acting in adversarial capacity, he exercised unfettered discretion
in deciding not to participate in polygraph examination without providing appropriate reason
on record for refusal); cf. United States v. Black, 684 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1982) (distin-
guishing McMorris and determining that federal prosecutor's refusal to stipulate to admission
of exculpatory polygraph evidence did not violate defendant's constitutional guarantees of due
process and compulsory process).
351. McMorris, 643 F.2d at 459.
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nation that it was dark that night, that the incident happened very quickly,
that he never had seen the defendant previously, and that he could not give
a description of his attacker to the police.3' The defendant denied commit-
ting the crime. 3
Anticipating a trial that would turn on the credibility of the opposing
witnesses, the defendant attempted to take a polygraph examination prior to
trial.3 Under Wisconsin law, the prosecutor must agree to stipulate to the
admissibility of the polygraph results before a court will admit polygraph
results into evidence.355 Without providing a reason, the prosecutor twice
refused to stipulate to the admissibility of the results.5 6 The court of appeals
determined that the proffered polygraph evidence was very important because
the case hinged on the credibility of the two key witnesses. 357 The Seventh
Circuit further noted that a prosecutor may refuse to enter into a stipulation
for numerous reasons, including a defendant's proposal to use an unqualified
examiner or offer to take the test under conditions not conducive to reliable
results.358 However, the court ruled that tactical considerations are not a
legitimate reason for the prosecution to refuse to enter into a stipulation.
359
The court concluded that the prosecutor must articulate reasons for refusing
to stipulate.36 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit found the prosecutor's veto
of the proposed test constitutionally impermissible under the Due Process
Clause.361
VI. The Response of the Federal Rules of Evidence to the
Polygraph Problem in Criminal Cases
Despite the logic of the compulsory process argument, 62 courts simply




355. See id. (listing preconditions before court will admit polygraph evidence) (citing
State v. Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1974)).
356. Id. at 460.
357. Id. at 461.
358. Id. at 464.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 466.
362. See supra notes 324-61 and accompanying text (explaining compulsory process argu-
ment).
363. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 243 (noting that few federal
courts have found compulsory process argument compelling and that there is little precedential
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however, the constitutional argument is unnecessary because the Federal
Rules of Evidence provide a sufficient basis for admissibility.364 The Posado
court implied that polygraph examinations were sufficiently reliable to be
admissible under Rule 104(a), assuming that the examiner was qualified and
that the surrounding conditions were reasonably conducive to producing an
accurate examination. 30 This conclusion is logical considering the other
scientifically-oriented and perception-based evidence that courts routinely
deem reliable.3s
The second aspect of the admissibility inquiry is whether the proffered
polygraph evidence falls within the terms of Rule 702 and assists the trier of
fact in resolving a fact at issue.3 67 Once a court has agreed to admit poly-
graph evidence, there is no basis for excluding it under Rule 702.368 Poly-
graph evidence is either uniformly scientifically invalid or it is uniformly
scientifically valid, and it is an inconsistency to admit some results and
exclude other results under the guise of Rule 702 analysis. 369 Thus, because
value in those cases in which courts accepted compulsory process argument). The authors note
that Jackson has little precedential value because it was overruled on appeal. Id. As for
McMorris, its impact was limited because some courts dismiss the idea that a prosecutor must
provide a reason for refusing to stipulate, whereas other courts refute the general proposition
that there is a constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence. Id.; see also id. at 245
n.160 (listing numerous cases in which courts rejected notion that there is constitutional right
to present polygraph evidence).
364. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding case to
district court for resolution, but concluding that per se rule against exclusion was no longer
viable and implying that, under circumstances of this case and applicable Federal Rules of
Evidence, court should admit polygraph evidence).
365. See id. at 434 (suggesting that polygraph evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
admissible, assuming that offering party takes reasonable precautions); see also supra note 15
(quoting language of Rule 104(a)).
366. See supra Part IV (comparing accuracy of polygraph with other scientific evidence
and eyewitness testimony and concluding that polygraph evidence is much more reliable than
many forms of evidence courts routinely admit).
367. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 433 (considering whether polygraph evidence is sufficiently
technologically advanced to constitute scientific knowledge within terms of Rule 702 and
Daubert); supra note 22 (discussing Rule 702 and how qualified witness may testify as to
scientific knowledge if such knowledge will aid trier of fact in determining fact at issue).
368. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 434 (listing elements that court considered in Rule 702
inquiry).
369. See supra note 22 (discussing terms of Rule 702). Once the first court agreed to
admit polygraph evidence, it conceded that polygraph results were scientifically valid. If one
polygraph result is scientifically valid, all polygraph results must be scientifically valid.
Certainly, other Federal Rules of Evidence may operate to exclude the proffered polygraph
testimony if the examiner was not qualified (Rule 104) or if the prejudicial effect of the
evidence substantially outweighs its probative value (Rule 403), but Rule 702 logically cannot
be used to exclude the results.
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nearly all courts accept polygraph evidence at least some of the time, 370 Rule
702 cannot provide the basis for excluding polygraph evidence.
The final aspect of the admissibility test applies Rule 403 to determine
whether the polygraph evidence has an unusually high and unfairly prejudi-
cial effect that would substantially outweigh its probative value.371 Numerous
studies have indicated that juries do not give undue weight to polygraph
testimony; 372 thus, it is difficult to imagine why courts would conclude that
the prejudicial effect of polygraph testimony substantially outweighs its
probative value. 37 If the polygraph evidence is reliable 74 and it does not
have an undue influence on the jury,375 courts should admit such evidence.
370. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting
that only Fourth, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits adhered to rule of per se inadmis-
sibility in 1989). But see Posado v. United States, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995)
(disclaiming prior per se rule of exclusion in Fifth Circuit and concluding that such rule is
no longer tenable after Daubert).
371. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 435 (describing Rule 403 as gatekeeper in whole process);
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing how Rule 403 operates to exclude evidence
if prejudicial effect of evidence substantially outweighs its probative value).
372. See supra Part IV (recounting numerous studies which indicate that juries do not
give undue weight to polygraph evidence).
373. See supra note 22 (quoting terms of Rule 702). It is important to note that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence must substantially outweigh its probative value. If
polygraph evidence is scientifically reliable and if juries do not give the evidence undue
weight, then courts should admit the evidence. In the case of a criminal defendant attempt-
ing to present exculpatory evidence, it is difficult to hypothesize a situation in which
evidence could meet the standards of Rules 104(a) and 702 yet have its prejudicial effect
substantially outweigh its probative value. But cf. United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663,
668 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that polygraph results were inadmissible under Rule 403 even
assuming that court could admit results under Rule 702), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343
(1996); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence was not, and usually will not be, admissible
pursuant to Rule 403 despite defendant's reliance on Daubert and Rule 702), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirm-
ing district court's Rule 403 analysis that excluded polygraph evidence and noting that
district court's Rule 403 balancing is afforded special degree of deference in relation to
polygraph evidence); Conti v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Rule 403), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 584-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (deciding that polygraph results were inadmissible under Rule 403 even
assuming that results were admissible under Rule 702 because defendant's responses would
not assist jury in its inquiry into facts).
374. See supra Part IV.A (describing empirical studies which indicate that polygraph
evidence is reliable).
375. See supra Part IV.B (describing empirical studies which indicate that polygraph
evidence does not have undue influence on trier of fact).
POSADO AND THE POLYGRAPH
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a criminal defendant offers
exculpatory polygraph evidence that meets the standards of Rule 104(a) and
Rule 702, yet the court reasonably excludes the evidence because its prejudi-
cial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 376 Exculpatory evi-
dence has probative value because the trier of fact must determine whether
the defendant committed the crime in question. However, courts have yet
to articulate a viable prejudice concern regarding polygraph evidence that
could substantially outweigh the inherent probative value in exculpatory
polygraph evidence.37 Thus, in the criminal context, the terms of Rule 403
are more appropriately described as a protective device, a shepherd that
keeps inherently bad evidence away from the jury, rather than as a gate-




Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts should admit unilaterally
obtained polygraph evidence on a collateral issue or at a proceeding other
than a jury trial if two preconditions are met. First, the courts should admit
polygraph results if the polygraphist is accredited and the conditions under
which the polygraphist administers the examination are reasonably well suited
to producing an accurate examination.379 Second, the defense should record
the pre-test interview, the examination, and the post-test interview so that the
prosecution has the opportunity to argue for exclusion of the results for any
number of valid reasons, including exclusion because the polygraphist asked
misleading questions. 3 ° The collateral issue limitation advocated by this
376. See supra note 18 (articulating terms of Rule 403).
377. See supra Part IV.A (noting that factual data does not support contention that
polygraphs are unreliable and, therefore, that courts should not admit results); supra Part
IV.B (discussing how fear that polygraph evidence has undue influence with jury is not
supported by empirical data); supra Part IV.C (dismissing Orne's friendly polygrapher
theory because no independently conducted studies support and most studies refute his
hypothesis).
378. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing role
of Rule 403 as that of gatekeeper). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there should be
a presumption that polygraph evidence is admissible in criminal cases. No justifiable evi-
dentiary basis exists for excluding the polygraph evidence assuming that the offering party
used reasonable precautionary measures to preserve the accuracy of the test. Therefore,
courts should consider Rule 403 a protective measure that only excludes polygraph evidence
obtained under unreasonably inaccurate conditions, rather than a "gatekeeper" that allows
judges to choose to admit evidence based on whimsical intuition.
379. See id. at 434 (noting importance of uniform conditions and accredited poly-
graphists and noting that requirements are becoming more standardized).
380. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (excluding poly-
815
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 769 (1997)
author effectively addresses the long-held fear of invading the province of the
jury; such testimony addresses an issue separate from the innocence or guilt
of the accused.381 Admitting polygraph results in a bench proceeding elimi-
nates the potential Rule 403 problem because the presence of a judge miti-
gates against the danger of unfair prejudice.38 Such a solution would
provide greater polygraph admissibility generally and would conform with
the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence.u
Further, this compromise position provides a pragmatic solution to a
problematic area of the law. Judges are reluctant to hear polygraph evidence
despite its apparent admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
best solution is to admit the evidence initially in limited circumstances. If
the proffered evidence assists the trier of fact, then perhaps courts will
comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence and choose to admit polygraph
evidence generally. If, however, polygraph evidence hinders the judicial
system, then at least courts could articulate a logical reason for the decision
to exclude the evidence. Posado is, therefore, a key case not only because
of its practical repercussions, but also because the Fifth Circuit's rationale
advocates a thoughtful Federal Rules of Evidence approach whenever a
defendant seeks to introduce polygraph evidence.
graph evidence because examiner's questions were such that defendant could have responded
truthfully yet still have committed crime in question), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996).
381. See Tarlow, supra note 1, at 99 (discussing jurisprudential idea that polygraph
machines intrude into innately human decisionmaking process of jury); cf. Thomas, supra
note 328, at 347 (dismissing argument that polygraph evidence will usurp traditional jury
function).
382. See supra note 18 (describing terms of Rule 403). Interestingly, Rule 403
specifically articulates the concern that the proffered evidence may mislead the jury, but says
nothing about cases or hearings in which a judge presides. Presumably, the authors of Rule
403 assumed that judges would be able to weigh all of the relevant evidence without being
unduly influenced by any singular piece of proffered evidence, so the danger of unfair
prejudice is mitigated in the case of a bench proceeding. There is no reason to think that
polygraph testimony should be treated any differently under Rule 403 than any other
evidence.
383. See supra Part Il (articulating language of Federal Rules of Evidence); supra Part
VI (describing application of Federal Rules of Evidence to determination of polygraph
evidence admissibility in criminal cases).
